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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS 437
to dealers to be shipped directly from the parent, it was said that the hold-
ing company was not doing business within the state and could not there
be served. In that case the parent was sued on a cause of action arising
out of a breach of contract it had itself made and the subsidiary was in
no way involved except as a possible basis for acquiring jurisdiction over
the parent. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra. However,
in the Cudahy case the court expressly distinguishes that case from such
a case as the principal one where an attempt is made to hold the parent
liable for an act or omission of the subsidiary.
For the purpose of imposing liability, the corporate identity will be dis-
regarded "where one corporation is so organized and controlled, and its
affairs are so conducted, that it is in fact a mere instrumentality or ad-
junct of another corporation." Industrial Research Corporation v. General
Motors Corporation, supra; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Minneapolis
Civic & Comm. Assn. (1918), 247 U. S. 490. In determining whether such
a situation exists, each case must be considered on its facts, and no general
rule can be laid down. Important evidentiary facts are the identity of
stockholders, identity of officers, the manner of keeping books and records
and the methods of conducting the corporate business as a separate con-
cern or as a mere department of the other concern. Ballantine, Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CA.L. L. REV. 12. In the principal case, the
subsidiaries were held to be mere conveniences employed by the principal
corporation in the transaction of its business. The chief value of the case
lies in the fact that it holds not only that the parent corporation might be
held liable for the patent infringement of the subsidiary, but that the
presence of the latter in the state is a basis for acquiring jurisdiction over
the former. J. N., '29.
HOMICIDE-CASTLE DocTRINE.-Defendant invited his brother-in-law
home to dinner. While there, both brandishing fire-arms, the defendant
shot and killed the brother-in-law. Self defense could not be made out, for
the deceased was in a defensive attitude. Held, that the "defense of castle
doctrine" does not apply, and the instruction thereon was properly refused,
the deceased having been present by invitation and not as an intruder.
Oney v. Commonwealth (1928), 225 Ky. 590, 9 S. W. (2d) 723.
The universally accepted doctrine has been stated thus: "The dwelling
house of a man is his castle and he may not only defend the same, if neces-
sary or apparently so, against one who manifestly endeavors to enter the
same in a wanton, riotous, or violent manner, or with intent to commit a
felony on him or some inmate of his household or guest, or the habitation
itself, but also against one who is only attempting to commit a misde-
meanor of a forcible entry, even to the extent of killing the assailant if such
degree of force be reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of pre-
venting a forcible entry against his will. State v. Bradley (1923), 126 S.
C. 528, 120 S. E. 240; see also 30 C. J. 83; Bishop, CRIMINAL LAW, (9th
ed.), v. 1, sec. 858. Bishop goes on to say that this defense does not apply
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in two situations: (1) Where the possessor of the dwelling "waives castle"
by permitting another to enter without a breaking into the house; (2) "If
a man enters another's dwelling-house peaceably on an implied license, he
cannot be ejected except on request to leave, followed by no more than the
necessary and proper force, even though misbehaving himself therein."
Idem., sec. 859. It will be seen that this second classification, "Putting out
of castle," is merely an enlargement on the first and shows that both apply
to the same situation, under which the principal case falls.
We may remark that the above exception really grows out of the state-
ment of the rule which assumes a breaking which is not permitted. But
the quotation from Bishop implies that under certain conditions, such as a
request to leave and the lapse of a reasonable time, the defense of castle
may renew itself and become good even though the first entry was by license.
People v. Hubbard (1923), 64 Cal. A. 27, 220 P. 315; State v. Bradley
(1923), 126 S. C. 528, 120 S. E. 240; Sargent v. State (1895), 35 Tex. Cr.
App. 325, 33 S. W. 264. Here we may note a possible distinction between
Bishop's two exceptions. Plainer proof of a request to leave might be re-
quired where the license to enter was express and not merely implied.
The exception usually invoked in favor of invited guests, State 'V. McIn-
tosh (1894), 40 S. C. 349, 18 S. E. 1033, also applies to any persons with
implied license to enter the dwelling, as members of the family, Common-
wealth v. Johnson (1906), 213 Pa. 432, 62 A. 1064; to a suitor for the hand
of a daughter of the family usually asked into the house, State V. Bradley
(1923), 126 S. C. 528, 120 S. E. 240; to a customer wishing to buy eggs ac-
cording to custom, Fortune v. Commonwealth (1922), 133 Va. 669, 112 S. E.
861; or to a relative visiting the home, Eversole v. Commonwealth (Ky.,
1896), 34 S. W. 231. Even more interesting is the fact that the protection ex-
tends to any persons present through legal right. For example, a person
attempting to execute a writ of possession on the dwelling and household
goods may not be kept out forcibly. Williams v. State (1906), 147 Ala. 10,
41 S. 992. The reason could well be that otherwise the writ could not be
executed. Also, officers either by virtue of a search warrant, or peaceably
entering as the owner allows them to do, are not intruders for this purpose.
Lakey v. State (1921), 206 Ala. 180, 89 S. 605.
The "castle," ordinarily a private dwelling, may be a boarding house,
Wells v. State (1911), 63 Tex. Cr. App. 618, 141 S. W. 96; a hotel, Sargent
v. State (1895), 35 Tex. Cr. A. 325, 33 S. W. 364; 6r a house rented by a
man who lives there with a woman not his wife, People v. Hubbard (1923),
64 Cal. A. 27, 220 P. 315. When the husband and wife live apart, the hus-
band has no right to enter the wife's dwelling with force and against her
will, especially when his purpose is not to enforce his marital rights.
People v. Watson (1913), 165 Cal. 645, 133 P. 298.
The present case causes little difficulty, for it involves an ordinary dwell-
ing and a normal invitation to dinner after a few social drinks, and lacks
any evidence of a request to leave. Under such circumstances, no one could
reasonably wish to give the murderer the complete or partial justification,
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according to the findings of necessity by the jury, that the castle doctrine
would afford. The killing was wanton, and it was proper to punish it fully.
R. J. H., '30.
HOMICIDE-INSANITY AS AFFECTING DEGREE op Gu=LT.-The defendant
was charged with murder and entered two pleas: not guilty, and not guilty
by reason of insanity. In a preliminary trial upon the latter plea, accused
was found sane. Held, it was not error to reject evidence of the defend-
ant's mental condition, offered to reduce the grade of the homicide under
the plea of not guilty. People v. Troche (Cal., 1928), 273 P. 767. The
doctrine of partial insanity is not recognized by the courts of California.
and insanity is a complete defense or none at all.
While this, no doubt, is the majority view and prevails both in those
states where the defense of insanity is available under a plea of not guilty
and in those where such a defense must be specially pleaded, the courts
generally have allowed evidence of intoxication and of "heat of blood," not
as a complete defense to homicide, but to indicate a condition of the mind
which renders it incapable of sustaining the deliberation and premeditation
necessary to support a charge of first degree murder. State v. Sporegrove
(1907), 134 Ia. 599, 112 N. W. 83; Commonwealth v. Colando (1911), 281
Pa. St. 343, 80 A. 571. Furthermore, the law which recognizes but one de-
gree of insanity has never precluded the introduction of evidence as to the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the commission of the crime when
presented together with the surrounding circumstances to reveal a lack of
the requisite intent in the defendant. Sage v. State (1883), 91 Ind. 141.
Thus it seems inconsistent and a matter purely of terminology to refuse to
recognize insanity which will lower the degree of crime for which a per-
son may be held responsible and at the same time to permit the condition
of the defendant's mind as influenced by outside circumstances to be shown
for the purpose of determining the gravity of the offense committed.
Notwithstanding the very simple "right and wrong" test as applied by
the majority of the courts, insanity is difficult of precise definition and
covers a variety of mental diseases, only the minority of which constitute
legal irresponsibility. Because of this and the tendency, whether conscious
or unconscious, of juries to permit a lay conception of insanity to influence
them, they have declared, in the face of obvious knowledge in the defend-
ant of right and wrong, such defendant insane. By the adoption of the
doctrine of partial insanity, which allows a reduction in the degree of the
crime charged, the liberation of persons who are not legally insane would
be somewhat diminished, if not entirely eliminated.
There are at least two states which have recognized the doctrine of partial
insanity. The supreme court of Utah in State v. Anselmo (1915), 46 Utah
137, 148 P. 1071, holds: "In determining the question of such design and
premeditation, they [the jury] should take into consideration all the facts
and circumstances developed at the trial as well as those relating to the
mental condition including that of intoxication of the accused where such
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